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I. INTRODUCTION
THE year 1909 saw the passage of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act, the latest in a succession of protectionist tariff acts. By early in the second decade of the twentieth century, there was already considerable popular sentiment to lower tariffs. By the summer of 1912, attention had focused on the tariff on sugar. Much like the debates over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the fall of 1993, the public had become transfixed with the debate over a particular trade issue, treating it as symbolic perhaps of greater struggles between competing economic forces in the country. In the debate over NAFTA, one of the most fascinating issues was not the legislation itself or its likely effect, but observing generally the political economy of trade policy reform and specifically the determinants of legislator voting. These political economy issues are the central focus of this article, which examines congressional voting on 338 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS addition to the methodology of the two components separately. Section IV discusses the data for and results from the event study. Section V then discusses the data for and results from the roll call regression. Section VI concludes. hostility to real and supposed monopolies. They represented the healthy uprising against monied domination."6 Sentiment for lowering tariffs was not unanimous. There were, of course, groups that benefited greatly from protective tariffs. Under a reduced tariff, American producers would either go out of business if they could not compete with their foreign counterparts or at least lose rents created by government protection.
II. HISTORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
Although there was a movement for widespread tariff reduction, we have chosen to focus on the sugar tariff. An important reason for this choice is the variety of producer interests which were involved in sugar policy. These interests were a by-product of the technology of sugar production and previous tariff policy.
Refined sugar, a consumer good, was produced by two techniques. First, refined sugar could be derived from sugarcane. Sugarcane was initially processed into raw sugar, a form which can be transported and stored for later refining.' Most of the raw sugar was produced in the tropics, especially Cuba, although Louisiana and some other southern states were also producers. American Sugar Refining Company, the corporate successor to the Sugar Trust, was by far the largest of the cane sugar refiners. Second, refined sugar could be derived from sugar beets. In the United States, this was accomplished through a continuous process in which sugar beets were processed into refined sugar within a single plant.8 Beet processing factories were located by necessity close to beet fields; therefore, the U.S. beet sugar industry used domestically grown beets exclusively.' Refined cane sugar and beet sugar were close substitutes.10
The tariff structure contained two chief components, the duty on raw (cane) sugar and the duty on refined sugar. Under the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909, the tariff was 1.685 cents per pound on raw sugar and 1.9 cents per pound on refined sugar." The four producer groups with important stakes in the sugar tariff were domestic sugarcane farmers, cane refiners, beet farmers, and beet refiners. The likely incidence of this tariff structure is summarized in Table 1. The table indicates whether a particular group benefited (+), was harmed (-), or was unaffected (0) by each provision. Where the effect is unclear a priori, two symbols appear.
Consider first the tariff on raw sugar. This tariff partially shielded domestic cane farmers from competition from the tropics. Since it raised the cost of their principal input, it harmed domestic cane sugar refiners. That tariff was also a chief impetus in the development of the American beet sugar industry. Its importance was underscored by the reaction to the proposed reduction of the tariff. As one official of the Western Sugar and Land Company, a beet sugar company, lamented, "There is no doubt in my mind but that our plant will shut down if [the Underwood Bill to eliminate sugar tariffs] becomes a law."12 A reduced tariff would harm both beet farmers and beet refiners, although not necessarily to the same degree. Contemporary economist Philip Wright argued, "Because of the highly specialized character of the plant and machinery in the factory phase of the industry, such factories as could not survive a reduced tariff would be nearly a dead loss. But land has so many alternative uses and the labor employed in both field and factory is such a simple semiskilled character that the abandonment of production would not greatly derange either the agricultural or labor interests."" Wright's assessment indicates that farmers and workers had only a small long-run stake in protection, although of course there could be a considerable dislocation in the short run.
The tariff on refined sugar may have benefited all four of these groups, but probably only to a limited extent. Europe was the center of the world's production of refined beet sugar. Although very little refined sugar was imported into the United States, the threat of imports from Europe affected U.S. prices, at least in some years.14 There is considerable testimony that in the early years following the formation of the Sugar Trust in 1887, imports were impeded; the threat of imports caused American Sugar Refining to set the price of refined sugar so that no refined sugar would be imported. The president of American Sugar Refining Company acknowledged this strategy in Congressional testimony in 1888 and 1894.15 In later years, imports of refined sugar may have been blockaded by transportation costs. In that case, the tariff on refined sugar would have no effect on U.S. prices. If the U.S. price of refined sugar was set to impede European imports, the tariff on refined sugar raised the U.S. price. It thereby helped cane and beet refiners and indirectly aided cane and beet farmers. It is important to note, however, that it is unclear whether sugar refining received net protection under this tariff structure. The refined tariff under the Payne-Aldrich law was only slightly above the tariff on raw sugar. A simple calculation yields an effective rate of protection (ERP) of 12.5 percent.16 This suggests that removing the tariffs on raw and refined sugars would harm U.S. cane refiners. A problem with the ERP calculation, however, is that it assumes sugar refining was perfectly competitive. United States refiners may have possessed domestic market power that was constrained by the threat of refined imports. To illustrate the possible implications, suppose that both domestic and European refiners possessed constant marginal and average costs, and the domestic refined price was set to impede European imports. If the raw and refined tariffs were reduced equally, U.S. refiners could choose to lower the refined price by the amount of the tariff reduction. This would preserve the prior margin over costs but at a higher quantity level due to the lower price. Imports from Europe would continue to be impeded. Therefore, the profits of U.S. cane refiners would be higher under the tariff reductions. 17 An important interest group omitted from Table 1 is sugar consumers, who would seem to have a large but diffuse stake in lowering the sugar tariff and hence sugar prices. In fact, since over 70 percent of U.S. sugar consumption took place directly in the household, there was relatively little opportunity for industrial consumers of sugar to organize and agitate for tariff reduction. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, consumer interests played an important role in tariff reform precisely because it had become a highly visible national issue.
For an interest group to influence policy, it must possess both motive and means. The foregoing discussion has provided motive. Means, or more formally, political efficacy, hinges on a theory of constituent interest. We discuss the competing theories in the next section. First, political efficacy may be shaped by the economic concentration of the interest group. As Olson indicated, the greater the economic concentration of a group, the more easily the group will overcome the freerider problem in organizing for political action. Under this view, the cane sugar refiners would be the most easily organized, since American Sugar Refining was a near monopoly. More numerous beet sugar refiners would face greater difficulty, and farmers and laborers would face the greatest difficulty in organizing.
Second, political efficacy may be determined by the total wealth and total monetary stake of the interest group. Politicians need both money and votes to secure reelection. As formalized in the case of tariff policy by William Brock and Stephen Magee, politicians support special interests in order to receive money, but they sacrifice votes in the process.22 In equilibrium, politicians balance the marginal contribution of money and votes in their reelection prospects. Applying this view to our setting, the most influential group would be cane refiners-in particular, their stockholders--who were wealthy. Although farmers and laborers were more numerous than stockholders, they should have relatively little effect. If a legislator adopted a pro-tariff position, the votes gained from farmers and laborers would be more than offset by the consumer votes lost as a result of that position. Therefore, farmers and laborers would be influential only if they could contribute money to compensate a legislator for the net votes lost by a pro-tariff position. Lacking considerable wealth, they should be less influential than cane refining shareholders.
Third, political efficacy may be determined by the number of members in, and hence votes from, an interest group. This corresponds most closely with the majoritarian ideal. If the political environment of tariff reform allowed consumers to overcome their free-rider problems and organize effectively, then the less concentrated of the producer groups may have been able to organize effectively as well. In this situation, farmers and laborers should be the most effective of the producer groups. to diminishing and ultimately vanishing returns, since the larger the group, the more diluted are its members' per capita stakes.23
Fourth, and finally, political efficacy may be influenced by the privileged position of the status quo. W. Max Corden argued that the political system uses trade policy to shield people from income loss and therefore may treat economic gains and losses differently.24 In our context, on any proposal to reduce the sugar tariff, potential gainers, such as cane refining interests, should be less influential than the potential losers, beet sugar interests and domestic cane farmers. In this way, the status quo level of tariffs may play an important role.
As mentioned in the introduction, two issues which can arise in such an analysis are determining the preferences of certain groups over legislative outcomes and determining the important, or pivotal, legislative events. The very nature of our political process, in addition to factors such as "strategic voting," can obscure the answers to these two questions. Obviously, in order to perform an analysis of a roll call vote, we need these answers; we must know on which votes to focus our analysis, the importance of various votes, and whether various constituent or interest groups prefer a certain piece of legislation over likely alternatives (and would therefore prefer a "Yea" vote, say), the "sign" of a vote. Researchers typically deal with these ambiguities by consulting contemporary accounts. Newspaper articles and trade journals, for instance, provide clues to how constituent groups perceive certain legislation and to how important a certain vote on the legislation is.
In this article we provide an additional methodology to help answer these questions. The idea is the following: if the interests of any particular constituent group could be represented by a publicly traded firm, we could observe how the stock price of the publicly traded firm reacted to the legislative vote. Loosely speaking, if the stock price reacted positively, then a vote on the winning side could be interpreted as a positive vote for that firm and consequently for the constituent group whose interests are represented by the firm. If the stock price failed to react, it might have been that the vote failed to contain information or was not "important."25 Of course, not all relevant constituent groups need to be represented by a publicly traded firm for this method to be of use. 
where Rit is the return on security i at time t, Rf is the risk-free rate of return, Rmt is the return on the market portfolio, and E, is an indicator variable for the event.27 An estimated positive and significant coefficient on E, is interpreted as meaning that the event was good news for the stock. This gives us information of two types: whether the event was important-that is, whether it conveyed information-and what effect that information had on the valuation of a particular company. Applications of this methodology would often be possible when studying the political economy of various economic policies. Many of the actors in such political debates do have interests which could be tied directly to a publicly traded firm, commodity, or other asset. In any case, this methodology does not obviate a careful reading of contemporary accounts. We use it here as a complement to such information in a situation where constituent preferences and importance of votes may have been significantly obscured.
Our application presented an additional problem in performing the event study. In the traditional event study, events must be unanticipated in order for the researcher to estimate their full effect on a firm's value, although partial effects may be estimated if the events are partly unanticipated.28 In our situation, we have legislative events, some of which were not only anticipated but might have even gradually become more of a foregone conclusion as the debates over the legislation wore on. quite possible that very little information was revealed at the actual time of the vote because very little uncertainty about the outcome of the vote remained, the uncertainty having largely been resolved through a series of many small events-senators' announcements, newspaper reports, and so forth-in the weeks or even months preceding the vote. In order to take account of the possibility of gradually leaking information, we devise and implement a technique which is tailored specifically to that situation. We explicitly model the effect of gradual information leakage on excess returns. This nontraditional event study is discussed following the results from the standard event study.
IV. THE EVENT STUDY

A. The Data
The data set for the event study consists of weekly stock prices from January 1910 through July 1914 for 50 firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange. We construct a market index from these data.29 As a proxy for risk-free rate of return, we employ the rate on time loans. 3O In terms of individual firms, our primary focus is on the excess returns of American Beet Sugar (ABS) and American Sugar Refining (ASR). Note that, although they are both sugar refiners, they could be affected very differently by tariff legislation. In particular, ABS produced beet sugar, therefore using a technology which required them to grow or purchase sugar beets domestically, while ASR refined cane sugar and so was free to purchase raw cane sugar from domestic or foreign producers. ABS, therefore, benefited from tariffs on raw cane sugar, while ASR was harmed. We will sometimes call the two sugar producing companies the "direct" group, since we would expect legislation on the sugar tariff to have a direct effect on them. Ideally, we would supplement the reactions of these two stocks with that of food processors that used sugar as an input. Unfortunately, no such firms were traded on the New York Stock Exchange during this time.
Additional information is available, however, from a less direct source. Companies with no direct ties to the sugar industry could be affected by sugar tariff developments to the extent that these developments signaled 29 The 50 possible changes in other tariffs directly affecting those companies. There are two possible, countervailing linkages. A lowering of the sugar tariff might indicate that Congress was inclined to lower the tariff on other goods. However, since tariffs were an important source of revenue for the federal government at the time, a lowering of one tariff might necessitate a raising of another to maintain revenue.31 Although the results from this indirect or signaling group of companies will be less useful for the roll call regression analysis than results from the direct group, they may be useful in confirming the importance of various events.
For the signaling group, we use the stocks of one rubber and two chemical companies, since tariff legislation on those products was to be considered after the debate on the sugar tariff. Moreover, contemporary accounts suggested the possible linkage between the sugar tariff and the tariff on those products. See Table 2 for the list of companies. In interpreting the results from the signaling group, one should note that the chemical companies benefited from the tariff on their outputs, while U.S. Rubber suffered from the tariff on its chief input, raw rubber.
The event study employs four events: COMMITTEE, HOUSE, SEN-ATE, and TAFT. Each of these four events corresponds to a different "veto point" in the legislative process. The event study can therefore help reveal which political actors were pivotal in restraining tariff reduction. We will describe in detail each event and its predicted effect on stock prices. of the event on ASR is arguably ambiguous. Our prediction, however, is for a (net) positive effect on ASR. We also predict a negative effect on the two chemical stocks because such an announcement might signal that the House of Representatives was intending to lower tariffs more than previously expected, and chemical tariffs were indeed to be discussed in the future. We also predict a negative effect on the rubber stock. Again in the March 1 article, the New York Times reported speculation that a tariff would be imposed on raw rubber to replace revenue lost by a reduction in the sugar duty. Under this logic, a larger-than-anticipated reduction in the sugar tariff would lead to a larger-than-anticipated increase in the raw rubber tariff, thereby hurting U.S. Rubber. In other words, our expectation is that the chemical and rubber stocks will react similarly but for different reasons. 
The traditional event study was then performed by regressing the excess returns on indicator variables for the event windows.35 Here we used 1-week windows for all of the events. See Table 3 for the results. This detects no reaction by either the direct or signaling group to any of the events. Our choice of a 1-week event window could be called into question. When the precise timing of an event is uncertain, there is a trade-off in the choice of event window. Two issues arise. The shorter the window, the more precise will be the estimates of the event response. However, the shorter the window, the more likely that the news, and hence the stock market's response, will fall outside the event window.
In this empirical setting, our primary concern was with the latter issue because of the gradual leakage of information characteristic of legislative events. Even in the aftermath of a congressional vote, there may be additional information released as the president and the members of the other legislative body revise their positions. Too narrow a window could omit much of this information. The use of a weekly, rather than a daily, event window helps address this, to a limited extent. Two-week windows did not qualitatively change the results.
Within the standard event study methodology, we could impose an even wider window, such as 4 or more weeks. At this point, however, the loss of statistical power would be substantial. As an alternative, we devise and implement a nontraditional event study. In essence, we estimate the window width simultaneously with the event response. Since we do not constrain the window width, this procedure does incur a loss of power relative to the standard event study with a fixed and known window width. In this context, the expected benefits justify that loss.
The following intuition underlies our approach. Recall that for unanticipated announcements which affect a stock's price, we would observe a discrete jump in price in the period in which the information was revealed. Suppose, however, information leaked out slowly, or diffused, about the event. Then, instead of all of the information being incorporated into the stock price at one time and causing a discrete jump, it would do so gradually over time. We do not know a priori the shape of this gradual incorporation, but an "S-shaped" curve or normal cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) shape does not seem an unreasonable parameteriza- 35 We have constrained parameters within the direct group to be opposite of each other, so the response by American Beet Sugar to an event is constrained to be equal to the negative of the response of American Sugar Refining. We also constrained parameters within the signaling group to be equal. Table 2 for a listing of the companies used in this event study.
tion. We note that not all information would be diffused by the time the announcement was made, so a small discrete jump might be observed on the date of the event. See Figure 2a . Finally, since we operationalize the ideas behind the event study by looking at excess returns rather than prices, Figure 2b confident, were not anticipated, so we just estimate a jump up (down) and back in the conditional mean for those two. We use an event window which contains both events and only estimate one reaction for them, y,. The reaction to the third and fourth events together, essentially the integral of the bump before them, is Y2. The bump is centered at time R. The parameter rl describes how diffuse the bump is. If in fact all the information is released in week R., this method will detect and estimate that (with qr close to 0), although the method will also accommodate a more diffuse pattern of information revelation. Table 4 contains the parameter estimates for this event study. Note that we have constrained the timing parameters, R and qr, and the error standard deviation cr to be equal within the signaling and direct groups but that we have allowed for free estimation of the reaction parameters, y, and Y2, for chemicals and rubber within the signaling group and for beet sugar and sugar refining within the direct group. Look first at the signaling group. In contrast to the traditional event study, the rubber stock has a positive and significant reaction to the second two events, SENATE and TAFT. This reaction is as predicted given the revenue maintenance effect. (The chemical stocks' reaction to both COMMIT-TEE and HOUSE and to SENATE and TAFT is negative and marginally significant at the 10 percent level. While it is surprising that they should react the same way to both sets of events, we will not place much weight on the estimates because of their marginal significance.) In the case of the rubber stock, at least, this event study has suggested the importance of SENATE and TAFT relative to the first two events.
The timing parameters for the signaling and direct groups, although significantly different, are all reasonable estimates. For the signaling group, the estimates imply a centering of the diffusion bump in the 23d week of the sample, around May 15, 1912, 2 months after the House vote, with 90 percent of the information being diffused between the beginning of April and the end of June. For the direct group, the estimates imply an earlier but tighter period of diffusion: 90 percent occurred between approximately the 13th of April and the 3d of May.
Look now at the reaction parameters for the direct group. The reactions to the first two events are not significant, again suggesting their relative lack of importance. The reactions of beet and refining to the second two events, however, are of the expected signs, with beet being significant at any reasonable level and refining being significant at approximately the 6 percent level. Moreover, the economic magnitude of the latter reactions is large, equal to a nearly 15 percent excess return. It is interesting to note that magnitudes of reactions of beet and refining to these and other events are practically identical but in opposite directions. These results support our intuition, gained from economic knowledge and contemporary accounts, that the events SENATE and TAFT seem to be the important, or pivotal, events and that beet sugar production interests reacted positively to these events while cane sugar refining interests reacted negatively.
V. THE ROLL CALL REGRESSION
A. The Data
If we are interested in determining how constituent interests influence legislative outcomes, we should study the determinants of roll call voting in the pivotal legislative body. For our roll call analysis, we therefore initially focus on the U.S. Senate roll call vote on sugar tariff legislation, which took place on July 27, 1912. This constituted the SENATE event in the event study.
Both the event study results and contemporary reports support the conclusion that the Senate and President Taft were the political agents which restrained dramatic reduction in the sugar tariff. In the event study, stocks did not react to the first two events, the COMMITTEE proposal and the HOUSE vote, signifying that those actions were unlikely to affect policy or were well anticipated. In contrast, there was a gradual response as information about the Senate's likely action was slowly diffused. The voting in the House was to some extent merely symbolic since, absent changes in the Senate, the House bill would not become law.36 Returning to the Senate vote, the event study and our examination of the historical record allow us to ascertain the "sign" of the legislator's vote. In particular, although the Senate bill reduced sugar tariffs, it was a pro-tariff bill, since the alternative was not the status quo but rather a more drastic tariff reduction exemplified by the House bill. This understanding is crucial to interpreting the influence of constituent interest on the Senate vote.
Earlier in the article, we outlined the likely incidence of tariff changes on a variety of interest groups. Now we determine how to measure the importance of those interest groups within a given geographic constituency.
First, for beet sugar interests, we use the per capita sugar beet production in each state, the variable BEET (see Table 5 ). Recall that beet farming and beet sugar production took place in close proximity to each other. As a result, this production variable is an excellent proxy for the combined importance of beet farmers and production workers. Of course, due to their geographic coincidence, we will be unable to estimate the separate influence of beet farmers and beet sugar manufacturers.
For cane sugar interests, we are able to measure the influence of each of the important groups separately. First, we use the production of sugar cane per capita, CANE, to represent sugarcane farmers (see Table 6 ). Second, the importance of sugar refinery workers is measured by a dummy variable, REFINING CENTERS, for those states which contained a cane sugar refinery.37 Variables measuring the geographic distri- bution of farmers and laborers are commonly employed in empirical studies of political economy. An important interest group that is usually omitted from these studies due to data limitations is shareholders. We, however, are fortunate to be able to include a measure of shareholder interest, SHARES, the number of shares of American Sugar Refining stock owned per capita in each state (see Table 7 )."38 Recall that ASR was the dominant cane refiner.
Our constituency interest variables, except for REFINING CEN-TERS, are measured on a per capita basis. A reasonable alternate speci- fication would measure the variables on an absolute basis. For example, per capita beet production might be low in a populous state, but the beet farmers might still exercise considerable influence because of their large total stake in the issue. In this circumstance, total beet production in a state would be the appropriate measure of constituent interest. In our empirical setting, however, we cannot distinguish between these two specifications. Since sugar and beet production were concentrated in a few states, the per capita and absolute production measures are highly correlated. The roll call regression results are therefore insensitive to which measure we employ.
We include no measure to represent consumer interests. Since there was a national movement for tariff reduction, consumer interests weighed heavily on legislators' minds. There is no reason to believe that consumer interest or sugar consumption varied between states. In that case, each legislator would weigh consumer interests equally, unless that legislator faced countervailing pressure from producer interests from his state.
B. Roll Call Results
We considered specifications both with and without political party as an explanatory variable. Considerable research on roll call voting has addressed the treatment and interpretation of political party. Some interpret the predictive power of the party variable to indicate the importance of "party discipline" or partywide logrolling on votes. Others view party as a proxy for legislator ideology. In our context, political party may be correlated with omitted constituent interest variables. In particular, a state strongly opposed to lowering the tariff would have anticipated that such votes would come up and would have elected a senator from the party with a pro-tariff platform, the Republican Party.
The Senate vote was almost strictly along party lines, with Republicans voting "Yea" and Democrats "Nay." In a statistical sense, political party has very strong explanatory power. But a closer examination reveals the importance of constituency interest. Paradoxically, if "party discipline" is an important factor in determining voting patterns, then departures from that discipline become all the more striking. In this case, only two senators crossed party lines. Both senators from Louisiana, Democrats, voted "Yea," the pro-tariff position, undoubtedly due to the importance of sugarcane farming in that state (see Table 6 ). In another noteworthy action, the Democratic senator from Colorado, a major beet producing state, abstained, balancing his constituency and party We estimated the coefficients 0 from a logit regression. Table 8 contains the parameter estimates for the logit regression. Since a "Yea" was coded as 1 and "Nay" as 0, positive coefficients indicate that an increase in that particular variable would increase the probability that the senator would vote "Yea," the pro-tariff position. To aid in interpretation, the last column of Table 8 reports the "marginal effect," the effect on the probability of voting "Yea" from increasing the independent variable by one unit, evaluated at the means of all the regressors.
The coefficient estimates on both per capita sugar beet production and per capita sugar cane production are positive and significant at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. This is in the expected direction, since both interests would lose from a reduced tariff. We are interested in not only the signs of the coefficients but their economic magnitude as well. This magnitude is large, as evidenced by the marginal effects. Increasing sugarcane production by 1 ton per person would raise the probability of a pro-tariff vote by over 15 percentage points. Raising beet sugar production would have a much larger effect, although that is not surprising, since BEET measures the political influence of both beet farmers and beet laborers, whereas CANE measures the influence of farmers alone. (One might also wish to compare the effects on the probability of voting "Yea" from increasing these independent variables by one standard deviation. For CANE, this would raise the probability by 8 percentage points, while for BEET, it would raise the probability by 20 percentage points.)
The coefficient estimates on both REFINING CENTERS and SHARES were not different from zero at conventional levels of significance. In addition, the economic effect of REFINING CENTERS, at least, is very small. Holding all other variables at their means, making a state a cane refining center would change the probability of a "Yea" vote by only 2.5 percentage points.
As an additional source of information about the legislative process, we also examine the determinants of legislator voting on the House vote to eliminate the sugar tariff. Recall from the event study that this vote appeared to be less important than the Senate vote. A further caveat in interpreting the results is that our constituency interest variables are measured on the state, rather than the Congressional district level, which could induce a bias in the results. Nevertheless, it is still instructive to examine the House.
As with the Senate, we considered specifications both with and without party affiliation. The House vote displayed significant but not strict party line voting. Democrats voted 173 to 8 in favor of the tariff abolition, with Republicans voting 95 to 22 against. Of the eight Democrats who crossed party lines, five were from the cane sugar state of Louisiana, and two were from the beet sugar state of Colorado. Of the 22 Republicans who voted for tariff abolition, 19 were from the Midwest, which was a center of opposition to tariffs and trusts. In the logit estimation, political party has significant explanatory power, but the constituency interest variables are also influential. We therefore focus on the logit regression of representatives' votes on our constituency variables. These results are reported in Table 9 . To aid in comparison with the Senate, a "Yea" vote, the vote for tariff reduction, was coded so that a positive coefficient on a constituency variable indicates that an increase in the variable would make a representative more likely to adopt the pro-tariff position. As with the Senate vote, the coefficients on both per capita sugar beet production and per capita sugar cane production are positive and significant at the 5 percent level. The economic magnitude of the effects is also quite large. In contrast with the Senate vote, the coefficients estimates for REFINING CENTERS and SHARES are large and statistically significant. The most surprising result is that for SHARES, since it suggests either that cane shareholders benefited from the tariff structure or that representatives voted against the interests of these constituents. This is not overly troubling, however, since the effect of the tariff structure on cane sugar refiners was acknowledged to be ambiguous.
We can now apply these empirical results to evaluate the four theories of constituent influence, placing primary emphasis on the Senate vote. These conclusions must be tempered, however, by the possibility that congressional voting on the sugar bills was part of a larger logroll within the political parties.
First, economic concentration did not play a preeminent role, unlike Olson's theory of collective action. Shareholders, although a concentrated and well-organized interest, did not have a statistically significant influence in the Senate. The minimal importance of this interest group also conflicts with the second theory, in which money plays an important role in reelections and hence in legislator voting. The high effectiveness of beet interests and cane farmers further suggests that interest groups overcame the problem of collective action and so lends support to the third theory, that political efficacy paralleled the majoritarian ideal.
One must be careful in the conclusion one draws from these results, however. A salient feature of this empirical setting is that information and organizational costs were unusually low due to the national movement for tariff reform. Concentrated interests may therefore have greater influence in the more common situations in which collective political action is difficult to undertake. If one wishes to contrast the outcome in this setting with the more usual situation, these results indicate that raising the visibility and political accountability of tariff policy can strengthen not only consumer interests but less concentrated producer interests as well.
Sugarcane refining interests, whether laborers or stockholders, did not have strong influence in seeking dramatic tariff reductions. Perhaps their influence was diminished precisely because there was such widespread popular support for reduction. The small political wave they might have generated was swept up in a great popular tide. Another possible explana-tion for the limited influence of cane refining interests is that the political system places greater weight on preventing economic losses than on generating economic gains, as indicated in Corden's theory of a conservative social welfare function.43
This fourth theory, that the political system places great weight on preservation of the status quo, has interesting implications for the political dynamics of trade policy. We found that sugarcane farmers and beet farmers and producers were the most influential of the producer interests in both legislative chambers, despite their relatively low (long-run) stakes. Yet, as Anne Krueger has argued, these very interests would not have existed absent previous protective tariffs." Those interests therefore cannot be accountable for the origins of the tariff. But once the protective tariff was established, it engendered economic forces which in turn became political forces for the perpetuation of the tariff. This example suggests a possible systematic bias in trade policy and highlights the need for further study of policy evolution.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article had two broad goals, one methodological and the other substantive, both involving economics and politics. Methodologically, we integrated two techniques, the event study and the roll call regression, in order to overcome some problems commonly encountered in work on political economy. In particular, we used the event study to ascertain the relative incidence and importance of congressional votes on tariff policy. With this information, we then employed roll call regressions to shed light on the political determinants of U.S. trade policy.
Substantively, we explored constituent influence in an unusual but informative empirical setting. Congressional voting on sugar tariff reform in 1912 took place against the backdrop of a national movement for tariff reform. As a result, legislator votes had a high level of visibility and political accountability. Moreover, the nature of the sugar industry and the sugar tariff gave rise to a variety of competing producer groups. In evaluating the effective power of these groups, we found that economic concentration and wealth were relatively unimportant. Strikingly, the most effective interest groups were those that had arisen as a consequence of the tariff, suggesting that government policy can form constituent groups as well as being formed by them. The action of 1916 was intended to "postpone" free trade in sugar until after World War I was resolved and "normal" conditions returned to the sugar market. Normalcy never returned. Government intervention into the sugar market continued, and in 1934 a system of domestic production and foreign import quotas was established. Although the quota system has generated even higher economic costs than the tariff, it has also displayed remarkable political endurance. Sugar economics and sugar politics have thus been intertwined from the second decade of the twentieth century to the present day. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
